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This paper examines how parallel importation in°uences pharmaceutical
innovation and the welfare of the economy, when cross-national drug
price di®erentials occur not only because of demand elasticity-based
factors, but also governmental drug price control-based factors. By
explicitly considering the governmental drug price control-based factors,
this paper shows that parallel importation may enhance pharmaceutical
innovation, when the bargaining power of a foreign government is strong
and the price elasticity of demand in the foreign market is small. We
also show that the increase in R&D induced by parallel imports may
even increase the consumer surplus of a country with high demand
elasticities which could face relatively low drug prices, if parallel imports
were not allowed.
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1 Introduction
Recently, many economists have argued that high income countries should
prohibit parallel imports of drugs from low income countries (e.g. Kremer,
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2002 and Danzon et al, 2003). A ban on parallel imports enables a phar-
maceutical company to set di®erent prices in di®erent markets according to
price elasticities of demand (\demand elasticity based price di®erentials").
Since demand elasticities are inversely related to income, the pro¯t max-
imizing pharmaceutical company sets lower (higher) drug prices in lower
(higher) income countries. Thus, a ban on parallel imports improves ac-
cess to the medicine in low income countries while it provides a greater
incentive for a product development to the pharmaceutical company, since
it can allow companies to capture closer to the full social surplus for their
product.
These arguments implicitly assume that the crossnational drug price
di®erentials are mainly due to demand elasticity based factors. However,
empirical studies, such as that of Maskus (2001) and Scherer (2003), show
that there are many other complicated factors that explain observed cross-
national drug price di®erentials. In particular, governmental price control
for pharmaceutical products is known to be one of these crucial factors.
Moreover, it is also known that the form and extent of governmental price
controls are heavily in°uenced by the lobbying activities of pharmaceuti-
cal companies. That is, the negotiation process between pharmaceutical
companies and the government. Therefore, suppose the crossnational drug
price di®erentials are mainly due to factors based on governmental price
control; then, it is not self evident that the ban on parallel imports of drugs
really leads to increased pharmaceutical innovation.
Focusing upon factors based on governmental price control in crossna-
tional drug price di®erentials, Pecorino (2002) reexamines the impact of
parallel imports upon a pharmaceutical company's pro¯ts and R&D in-
centives. In his model, one monopolist in the home country sells in both
the domestic and foreign markets. Since these two markets have identical
demand elasticities, the demand elasticity based price di®erentials never
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occur. The ¯rm can freely set its domestic price. However, owing to
governmental price control, the foreign price is determined by the Nash
bargaining game between the ¯rm and the foreign government. In the No
Reimport regime (NR regime), the domestic government does not allow
parallel imports of drugs. Thus, perfect market segmentation is possible
and the ¯rm charges its pro¯t maximizing price in the domestic market
while the negotiated foreign price becomes lower than in the domestic mar-
ket. Therefore, under the NR regime, the price di®erentials are purely due
to factors based on the governmental price control (\price control based
price di®erentials"). In the Reimport regime (R regime), the domestic gov-
ernment allows parallel imports of drugs. Thus, the law of one price holds
and the negotiated foreign price also becomes the domestic price as well
(\uniform pricing e®ect"). This fact implies that the negotiation results
in°uence not only the pro¯ts from the foreign market, but also the pro¯ts
from the domestic markets under the R regime. Therefore, a ¯rm has an
incentive to bargain harder under the R regime than under the NR regime
(\strengthened negotiation e®ect").
The comparison of the results under the NR regime and the R regime
suggests that parallel imports may provide the following two competing
impacts upon the ¯rm's pro¯ts and R&D incentives. First, parallel im-
portation has a negative impact upon the ¯rm's total pro¯ts through the
\uniform pricing e®ect" since it lowers the domestic price and the pro¯ts
from the domestic market. However, second, parallel importation has a
positive impact upon the ¯rm's total pro¯ts through the \strengthened
negotiation e®ect" since it increases the level of the uniform price in both
the domestic and foreign markets. Pecorino (2002) shows that the latter
\strengthened negotiation e®ect" always dominates the former \uniform
pricing e®ect" under the plausible speci¯cation of the demand function.
Thus, parallel importation has positive impacts upon the pharmaceutical
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company's pro¯ts and incentives to invest in R&D.
These existing studies show that, if the di®erential pricing is purely
demand elasticity based, parallel importation reduces pharmaceutical in-
novation. However, if the di®erential pricing is based on purely governmen-
tal price control, parallel importation promotes pharmaceutical innovation.
Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to construct a theoretical model that
enables us to analyze the cases where price di®erentials occur because of
both demand elasticities and negotiation based factors. Then, we analyze
more extensively under what economic environments parallel importation
leads to increased or decreased pharmaceutical innovation. Moreover, by
explicitly considering the existence of the price control based price di®er-
ential, we reexamine the impact of parallel importation upon the consumer
surplus of the home and foreign country. Since the observed crossnational
price di®erentials are due to various complicated factors, including both
governmental price control based and demand elasticity based factors, it is
signi¯cant to investigate these issues carefully for the sake of more valuable
policy debates.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 establishes the ba-
sic setup. Section 3 examines the case where the domestic government
does not allow parallel imports (NR regime). Section 4 examines the case
where the domestic government allows parallel imports (R regime). Sec-
tion 5 examines the impact of parallel imports upon R&D investment by
comparing the results from the NR regime and the R regime. Section 6
examines the impact of parallel imports upon welfare. Section 7 presents
our conclusions.
2 Basic Setup
This paper considers a simple partial equilibrium model of trade that
consists of two countries: home (H) and Foreign (F). A ¯rm in the home
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country produces a good of quality s > 0, which can be thought of as a
pharmaceutical product sold in both the domestic and foreign markets.
We use a model of vertical product di®erentiation to represent consumer
preferences in each market. Consumers di®er in their tastes for the product
quality, but they rank quality in the same way. When a consumer of type
t in the market i = H;F buys a product of quality s at a price pi, his or
her utility is given by ui = ts¡ pi. If a consumer does not buy, his or her
outside option is normalized to zero. In each market i, a consumer of type
t is uniformly distributed between 0 and T i with unit density. For clarity
of the analysis, we consider the case TF · TH and specify TH and TF as
follows: TH = T and TF = ÁT 0 · Á · 1. These speci¯cations assume
that the maximum willingness to pay in the foreign market is smaller than
or equal to that in the domestic market. After a simple calculation, it also
implies that the price elasticities of demand in the foreign market are larger
than or equal to those in the domestic market. Therefore, as the value of
Á becomes larger and approaches one, the value of the price elasticities of
demand in the foreign market becomes smaller and approaches the value
in the domestic market. Conversely, as the value of Á becomes smaller,
the value of the price elasticities of demand in the foreign market becomes
larger relative to that in the domestic market.
A ¯rm conducts R&D and sets the quality of its product according to a
cost function C(s), which satis¯es C0(s) > 0 and C00(s) > 0. Then, it man-
ufactures and delivers its product in both the domestic and foreign mar-
kets. Once a product has been developed, its marginal cost of production
is not a®ected by the level of quality. Thus, we normalize the marginal cost
of production to zero. If the domestic government provides no reimport
regime (NR regime), reimports of the good back into the home country are
not allowed. Thus, a ¯rm can set a di®erent price in each market because
perfect market segmentation is possible under the NR regime. However, if
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the domestic government provides a reimport regime (R regime), reimpor-
tation of the good back into the home country is allowed. Thus, a ¯rm has
to set a uniform price for both the domestic and foreign markets.
Therefore, the order of decision making is summarized as follows. First,
the domestic government declares a parallel import regime. Then, the ¯rm
decides on the quality levels with which it will endow its product. Finally,
the ¯rm manufactures and delivers the product in each market and sets
the prices.
3 NR Regime
We ¯rst consider the price determination process under the assumption
that costs of quality development have already been sunk. Since perfect
market segmentation is possible under the NR regime, a ¯rm can set dif-
ferent prices in each market. In the domestic market, since the ¯rm has
patent protection on this product, it can act as a monopolist. Since t is
uniformly distributed between 0 and TH , the demand in the home coun-
try is XH(pH) = sT¡p
H
s
. Thus, the pro¯t on domestic sales is given by
¦H(pH) = sT¡p
H
s
pH . By maximizing this pro¯t with pH , we obtain
pHNR(s) =
sT
2
; (1)
¦HNR(s) =
(sT )2
4s
; (2)
where pHNR(s) is the price and ¦
H
NR(s) is the pro¯t in the domestic market
under the NR regime. In order to stress that these values depend upon the
level of product quality s, we denote them as a function of s.
The demand and the pro¯t in the foreign market are given by XF (pF ) =
sÁT¡pF
s
and ¦F (pF ) = sÁT¡p
F
s
pF . If the ¯rm were free to set its own price
in the foreign market, it would charge the monopoly price sÁT
2
and obtain
the pro¯t (sÁT )
2
4s
. However, because of governmental control of the drug
price, the foreign drug price is determined by the Nash bargaining game
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between the ¯rm and the foreign government. This assumption is relevant
in the pharmaceutical context.
The foreign government would like to maximize consumer surplus in
its country, whereas the monopolist would like to maximize pro¯ts from
sales in the foreign market. The consumer surplus in the foreign country
is given by CSF (pF ) = (sÁT¡p
F )2
2s
. In the absence of agreement, pro¯ts
and consumer surplus are both zero. Thus, zero is the threat point for
both the domestic ¯rm and the foreign government. Therefore, the Nash
bargained price in the foreign market under the NR regime pFNR is found
by maximizing
[CSF (pF )]®[¦F (pF )]1¡®; (3)
with pF subject to the condition that ¦(pF ) ¸ 0 and CSF (pF ) ¸ 0. Here,
® re°ects the bargaining power of the foreign country. A simple calculation
yields
pFNR(s) =
(1¡ ®)sÁT
2
; (4)
¦FNR(s) =
(1¡ ®2)(sÁT )2
4s
; (5)
where pFNR(s) is the price and ¦
F
NR(s) are the pro¯ts in the foreign market
under the NR regime. The results here depend very obviously on ®. When
® = 1, since the foreign government has the all the bargaining power, we
must have pFNR(s) = 0 and ¦
F
NR(s) = 0, which means that pro¯t for sales
in the foreign market is zero. On the other hand, when ® = 0, since the
domestic ¯rm has the all the bargaining power, we have pFNR(s) =
sÁT
2
and ¦FNR(s) =
(sÁT )2
4s
, which means that the domestic ¯rm charges the
monopoly price and obtains monopoly pro¯t in the foreign market.
Under the NR regime, total pro¯ts of ¯rms from sales in both the domes-
tic and foreign markets, which are given by ¦TotalNR (s) = ¦
H
NR(s)+¦
F
NR(s),
are
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¦TotalNR (s) =
(sT )2
4s
[1 + (1¡ ®2)Á2]: (6)
Moreover, the consumer surplus of the home country CSHNR(s), which is
given by
(sT¡PHNR(s))2
2s
and the consumer surplus of the foreign country
CSFNR(s) , which is given by
(sÁT¡PFNR(s))2
2s
, are as follows.
CSHNR(s) =
(sT )2
8s
; (7)
CSFNR(s) =
(sÁT )2
8s
(1 + ®)2: (8)
Then, we consider the quality choice of the ¯rm. The ¯rm will choose
its quality level s in order to maximize its net total pro¯t under the NR
regime ¦^NR(s):
¦^NR(s) = ¦
Total
NR (s)¡ C(s): (9)
The ¯rst order condition to this problem implies
C0(s) =
¦TotalNR (s)
s
;
=
T 2
4
[1 + (1¡ ®2)Á2]:
(10)
Let the quality level that solves Equation (10) be denoted as sNR, which
expresses the level of the R&D investment conducted by a ¯rm under
the NR regime. Therefore, by substituting this sNR into Equations (1),
(4),(6),(7) and (8), we can obtain the value of prices in both the domestic
and foreign markets, consumer and social surpluses of the home country,
and the consumer surplus of the foreign country under the NR regime.
4 R Regime
We ¯rst consider the price determination process. Under the R regime,
the negotiated foreign price also becomes the domestic price, owing to the
ability to reimport and the absence of transportation costs. Thus, the law
of one price holds for the good in question: (i.e. pH = pF = p).
The foreign drug price is again determined by the negotiation between
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the ¯rm and the foreign government. The foreign government's surplus
from bargaining under the R regime is CSF (p) and the threat point is
zero, which is analogous to the NR regime case. However, the domestic
¯rm's surplus (threat point) changes from ¦F (pF ) (0)under the NR regime
to ¦H(p)+¦F (p)¡¦HNR(s) (¦HNR(s) ) under the R regime. ¦H(p)+¦F (p)
re°ects pro¯ts in both the domestic and foreign markets when reimports
are allowed, and ¦HNR(s) only re°ects the pro¯ts from sales in the domestic
market achieved by setting the home country monopoly price sT
2
.
These changes in the ¯rm's surplus and the threat points are explained
as follows. Under the NR regime, whether or not agreement is reached,
pro¯ts from home sales are always ¦HNR(s). Therefore, the ¯rm's surplus
from bargaining is independent of the pro¯ts from home sales. However,
under the R regime, the ¯rm's pro¯t from home sales is in°uenced by
the negotiated foreign price. As a result, the term ¦H(p) appears in the
¯rm's surplus. In the absence of agreement, the ¯rm cannot sell in the
foreign market. However, the ¯rm can at least obtain pro¯ts ¦HNR(s) by
setting monopoly price sT
2
in the home country. Therefore, the threat
point of ¯rms under the R regime becomes ¦HNR(s). This implies that, if
the condition
¦H(p) + ¦F (p) ¸ ¦HNR(s) (11)
does not hold, the ¯rm does not sell in the foreign market. Taking this
constraint into account, we obtain the following Lemma.
Lemma 1.
If the price elasticities of demand in the foreign market relative to in
the domestic market are su±ciently high to satisfy the condition that
Á <
p
2¡ 1, there exists no incentive for ¯rms to sell in the foreign
market under the R regime.
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Thus, with the R regime, when Á <
p
2 ¡ 1, the ¯rm sets its price as
follows.
pR1(s) =
sT
2
; (12)
where pR1(s) denotes the price under the R regime when Á <
p
2 ¡ 1.
In addition, the total pro¯ts under the R regime, which are given by
[ sT¡pR1(s)
s
]pR1(s), are
¦TotalR1 (s) =
(sT )2
4s
; (13)
where ¦TotalR1 (s) denotes the pro¯t under the R regime when Á <
p
2 ¡
1. Since pR1(s) = p
H
NR(s) holds by de¯nition, the condition ¦
Total
R1 (s) =
¦HNR(s) also holds.
Suppose the condition Á ¸ p2 ¡ 1 holds, the domestic ¯rm reaches an
agreement with the foreign government and starts to sell in the foreign
market. Thus, when Á ¸ p2¡ 1, the Nash bargained uniform price under
the R regime is found by maximizing
[CSF (p)]®[¦H(p) + ¦F (p)¡¦HNR(s)]1¡®; (14)
with p subject to the condition that CSF (p) ¸ 0 and Equation (11). Here,
Equation (11) is rewritten as
~p · p · ¹p: (15)
where
~p ´ sT
4
[1 + Á¡
p
(1 + Á)2 ¡ 2];
and
¹p ´ sT
4
[1 + Á+
p
(1 + Á)2 ¡ 2]:
Taking this constraint into accounts, we obtain
pR2(s) =
sT
8
[(1 + ®)(1 + Á) + 4(1¡ ®)Á¡
p
X]; (16)
where
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X ´ (1 + ®)2(1 + Á)2 ¡ 8[®+ (1¡ ®)2Á(1¡ Á)]
and pR2(s) denotes the price under the R regime, when Á ¸
p
2 ¡ 1. In
addition, when Á ¸ p2¡ 1, the total pro¯ts ¦totalR (s) under the R regime,
which is given by [ sT¡pR2(s)
s
]pR2(s) + [
sÁT¡pR2(s)
s
]pR2(s), are
¦TotalR2 (s) =
(sT )2
4s
Y; (17)
where
Y ´ [ (1¡ ®
2)(1 + Á)2
4
+2(1¡®)2Á(1¡Á)+®+ (1¡ ®)(3Á¡ 1)
4
p
X]
and ¦TotalR2 (s) denotes the pro¯ts under the R regime when Á ¸
p
2 ¡
1. The results here again depend very obviously on ®. When ® = 1,
since the foreign government has the all the bargaining power, we must
have PR2(s) = ~p, which is the lowest price satisfying the participation
constraints of the domestic ¯rm. On the other hand, when ® = 0, since the
domestic ¯rm has the all the bargaining power, we have PR2(s) =
sT
4
(1+Á),
which is the monopoly price that maximizes ¦H(p) + ¦F (p) given the
restriction on uniform pricing under the R regime.
The changes in the domestic ¯rm's surplus and the threat points dis-
cussed above suggest that price concessions by the ¯rm under the R regime
are much more costly than those under the NR regime, because they a®ect
the domestic market as well as the foreign market. As a result, we should
expect the domestic ¯rm to drive a harder bargain under the R regime
than under the NR regime. We denote this as the \strengthened negoti-
ation e®ect" due to the parallel imports. This \strengthened negotiation
e®ect" leads to higher total pro¯ts under the R regime than under the NR
regime. Therefore, the condition ¦TotalR (s) ¸ ¦TotalNR (s) for 8 s is more
likely to hold. However, under the R regime, the law of one price holds
because of the ability to reimport. We denote this as the \uniform pricing
e®ect" due to the parallel imports. This \uniform pricing e®ect" leads to
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lower pro¯ts under the R regime than under the NR regime. Therefore, the
condition that ¦TotalR (s) ¸ ¦TotalNR (s) for 8 s is less likely to hold. Thus,
the overall e®ect on ¯rm pro¯tability appears to be ambiguous.
Therefore, under the R regime, the price PR(s) and the total pro¯ts of
¯rm ¦TotalR (s) are expressed as follows.
PR(s)
8<:= PR1(s) if Á <
p
2¡ 1;
= PR2(s) if Á ¸
p
2¡ 1;
(18)
¦TotalR (s)
8<:= ¦
Total
R1 (s) if Á <
p
2¡ 1;
= ¦TotalR2 (s) if Á ¸
p
2¡ 1:
(19)
Moreover, the consumer surplus of the home country CSHR (s), which is
given by (sT¡PR(s))
2
2s
, is
CSHR (s)
8<:= CS
H
R1(s) if Á <
p
2¡ 1;
= CSHR2(s) if Á ¸
p
2¡ 1;
(20)
where
CSHR1(s) ´ (sT )
2
8s
;
CSHR2(s) ´ (sT )
2
128s
[7¡ 5Á+ ®(3Á¡ 1) +
p
X]2:
In addition, the consumer surplus of the foreign country CSFR (s), which is
given by (sÁT¡PR(s))
2
2s
, is
CSFR (s)
8<:= 0 if Á <
p
2¡ 1
= CSFR2(s) if Á ¸
p
2¡ 1
(21)
where
CSFR2(s) ´ (sT )
2
128s
[(1 + ®)(3Á¡ 1) +
p
X]2:
Then, we consider the quality choice of the ¯rm. The ¯rm will choose its
quality level s in order to maximize its net total pro¯t under the R regime
¦^R(s):
¦^R(s) = ¦
Total
R (s)¡ C(s): (22)
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The ¯rst order conditions to this problem imply
C0(s) =
¦TotalR (s)
s
;8<:= T
2
4
if Á <
p
2¡ 1;
= T
2
4
Y if Á ¸ p2¡ 1:
(23)
Let the quality level that solves Equation (23) be denoted as sR1 (sR2),
which expresses the level of the R&D investment conducted by a ¯rm under
the R regime, when Á <
p
2¡ 1 (Á ¸ p2¡ 1). Therefore, by substituting
these sR1 and sR2 into Equations (12), (13),(16),(17),(20) and (21), we can
obtain the values of the price, consumer surplus and social surplus of the
home country, as well as the consumer surplus of the foreign country under
the R regime.
5 The Impacts of Parallel Imports upon R&D investment
and the Net Total Pro¯t
This section examines how parallel importation in°uences R&D invest-
ment and the net pro¯t of the ¯rm. By comparing the results in Equation
(10) and (23), we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 1.
1. When Á <
p
2¡ 1, the relation ¦TotalR (s) · ¦TotalNR (s) for 8 s holds.
Thus, the R&D investment under the NR regime is higher than or
equal to that under the R regime.
2. When Á ¸ p2¡ 1,
(a) the R&D investment under the NR regime is higher than or
equal to that under the R regime, if the relation ¦TotalR (s) ·
¦TotalNR (s) for 8 s holds.
|651|
?????? 63 ?? 3 ?
(b) the R&D investment under the R regime is higher than or
equal to that under the NR regime, if the relation ¦TotalR (s) ¸
¦TotalNR (s) for 8 s holds.
Proposition 1-1 indicates that parallel importation leads to lower R&D
investment, if the price elasticities of demand in the foreign market are
su±ciently high to satisfy the condition that Á <
p
2¡1. When Á < p2¡1,
under the R regime, the ¯rm has no incentive to sell in the foreign market as
shown in Lemma 1. Thus, the ¯rm sells only in the domestic market at the
home monopoly price and obtains pro¯ts ¦TotalR1 (s) = ¦
H
NR(s). However,
under the NR regime, the ¯rm has an incentive to sell in both the domestic
and foreign markets irrespective of the value of Á, since the ¯rm can set
di®erent prices in di®erent markets according to their price elasticities of
demand. Thus, the ¯rm sets the price PHNR(s) in the home country and
PFNR(s) in the foreign country, respectively, and obtains pro¯ts ¦
Total
NR (s) =
¦HNR(s) + ¦
F
NR(s). These results suggest that parallel importation makes
it impossible for the ¯rm to obtain pro¯ts from the foreign market, when
Á <
p
2¡1 (\the loss of foreign market e®ect"). Thus, parallel importation
leads to lower R&D investment when Á <
p
2 ¡ 1 because of \the loss of
foreign market e®ect".
However, Proposition 1-2 indicates that parallel importation may lead
to higher R&D investment if the price elasticities of demand in the foreign
market are su±ciently low to satisfy the condition that Á ¸ p2 ¡ 1 and
the condition ¦TotalR (s) ¸ ¦TotalNR (s) for 8 s holds. As mentioned in the
Section 4, since the negotiated foreign price a®ects not only the pro¯ts
from the foreign market, but also the pro¯ts from the domestic market,
the ¯rm has an incentive to drive a harder bargain under the R regime
than under the NR regime. This \strengthened negotiation e®ect" leads
to higher total pro¯ts under the R regime than under the NR regime.
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Therefore, the condition ¦TotalR (s) ¸ ¦TotalNR (s) for 8 s is more likely to
hold. However, under the R regime, the law of one price holds because of
the ability to reimport. This \uniform pricing e®ect" leads to lower pro¯ts
under the R regime than under the NR regime. Therefore, the condition
that ¦TotalR (s) ¸ ¦TotalNR (s) for 8 s is less likely to hold. These results
suggest that parallel importation leads to higher R&D investment when
Á ¸ p2 ¡ 1, supposing the \strengthened negotiation e®ect" dominates
the \uniform pricing e®ect".
To investigate more extensively under what economic environments for
parallel importation leads to higher or lower R&D investment, we compare
the results under the NR and R regimes for some values of ® and Á. Firstly,
we examine the case when ® = 0 and 1 and obtain the following results.
Result 1.
1. When all the bargaining power resides with the domestic ¯rm (® =
0), the R&D investment under the NR regime is higher than or equal
to that under the R regime.
2. When all the bargaining power resides with the foreign government
(® = 1), the R&D investment is the same under either regime.
Result 1-1 indicates that parallel importation leads to lower R&D invest-
ment when ® = 0. When ® = 0, since all the bargaining power lies with
the domestic ¯rm, price controls by the foreign government become mean-
ingless. Thus, the ¯rm can freely set the price in the foreign market under
either the NR or R regime. Under the NR regime, the ¯rm can set dif-
ferent prices in di®erent markets. However, under the R regime, the ¯rm
has to set a uniform price in both markets. Thus, total pro¯ts under the
R regime are lower than those under the NR regime. This result implies
that parallel importation leads to lower ¯rm pro¯ts and, thus, lower R&D
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investment.
Result 1-2 indicates that parallel importation has no impact upon R&D
investment when ® = 1. When ® = 1, since all the bargaining power lies
with the foreign government, the foreign government can freely set the price
in the foreign market under either the NR or R regimes. Under the NR
regime, the foreign government maximizes the consumer surplus by setting
the foreign price as zero. Thus, the domestic ¯rm obtains zero pro¯ts from
sales in the foreign market. This means that the total pro¯ts under the
NR regime equal the domestic monopoly pro¯ts (i.e. ¦TotalNR (s) = ¦
H
NR(s)).
However, under the R regime, the foreign government has to set the price
that satis¯es the participation constraint of the domestic ¯rm de¯ned in
Equation (11). Thus, the ¯rm sets the foreign price as ~p, which is also
becomes the domestic price. From Equation (11), when p = ~p, total pro¯ts
under the R regime equal the domestic monopoly pro¯ts (i.e. ¦TotalR (s) =
¦HNR(s)). These results imply that parallel importation has no in°uence
upon the ¯rm's pro¯ts and thus none on the R&D incentives. Note that,
when ® = 1, all the bargaining power lies with the foreign government
irrespective of the parallel import regimes. Thus, the impact of the ¯rm's
strengthened bargaining power induced by parallel importation becomes
signi¯cant. Result 1-2 implies that the \strengthened negotiation e®ect"
is large enough to cancel out the \uniform pricing e®ect".
Secondly, we examine the case when Á = 1
2
and 1, respectively, and
obtain the following results.
Result 2.
1. When the price elasticities of demand in the foreign market satisfy
the condition that Á = 1
2
, the R&D investment under the NR regime
is higher than or equal to that under the R regime.
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2. When the price elasticities of demand in the foreign market satisfy
the condition that Á = 1, R&D investment under the R regime is
higher than or equal to that under the NR regime.
Results 2-1 and 2-2 indicate that parallel importation leads to lower R&D
investment when Á = 1
2
, whereas it leads to higher R&D investment when
Á = 1. The higher value of Á implies a lower value of the price elasticities
of demand in the foreign market. Therefore, the negative impacts of the
\uniform pricing e®ect" weaken as the value of Á becomes higher.
Finally, we consider the case when Á = 3
4
and 7
8
, respectively, and obtain
the following results.
Result 3.
1. When the price elasticities of demand in the foreign market satisfy
the condition that Á = 3
4
, the R&D investment under the R regime
is higher (lower) than or equal to that under the NR regime, if ® ¸
®^Á= 3
4
(® · ®^Á= 3
4
). The ®^Á= 3
4
is de¯ned as ®, which satis¯es the
condition that fÁ= 3
4
(®) = 0, where fÁ= 3
4
(®) ´ 5p25 + 18®+ 25®2¡
(11®+ 27).
2. When the price elasticities of demand in the foreign market satisfy
the condition that Á = 7
8
, the R&D investment under the R regime
is higher (lower) than or equal to that under the NR regime, if ® ¸
®^Á= 7
8
(® · ®^Á= 7
8
). The ®^Á= 7
8
is de¯ned as ®, which satis¯es the con-
dition that fÁ= 7
8
(®) = 0, where fÁ= 7
8
(®) ´ 13p169 + 50®+ 169®2¡
(27®+ 171).
3. The value of ®^Á= 7
8
is smaller than the value of ®^Á= 3
4
.
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Results 3-1 and 3-2 indicate that, given a su±ciently high value of Á,
parallel importation leads to the higher (lower) R&D investment, when
the value of ® is higher (lower) than a certain threshold value. Moreover,
Result 3-3 provides us an insight that the range of ® where the parallel
import leads to higher R&D investment becomes wider as the value of Á
becomes larger. Therefore, Result 3 suggests that parallel importation is
likely to induce higher R&D investment, as the values of both ® and Á
become larger.
In order to con¯rm the results discussed above and obtain more insight,
we provide a numerical example. For illustrative purposes, we specify the
functional form of the cost function of R&D C(s) as
C(s) =
1
¯
s¯ ¯ > 1; (24)
where ¯ is the parameter that determines the curvature of the marginal cost
function. A higher value of ¯ implies a higher slope of the marginal cost
function. Following Valletti (2005), we set the baseline parameterization
of the model as follows: T = 10, k = 30 and ¯ = 3.
Table 1 shows the di®erence in the R&D investment SR ¡ SNR between
the two regimes for various sets of the values of Á and ®. For later analysis,
we denote the parameter region of (Á, ®) that satis¯es Á · 0:4 < p2 ¡ 1
as the Case 1 region. The Case 1 region is shown as the shaded area in the
light gray in Table 1. As shown in Proposition 1, when Á · 0:4 < p2¡ 1,
parallel importation leads to lower R&D investment. In this region, since
the price elasticities of demand in the foreign market are too high for the
¯rm to sell in the foreign market under the R regime, parallel importation
reduces the ¯rm's pro¯ts and incentives to invest in R&D.
When Á ¸ 0:5 > p2¡ 1, there exist two di®erent regions. One is the re-
gion where parallel importation leads to lower R&D investment. The other
is the region where parallel importation leads to higher R&D investment.
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We denote the former region as the Case 2 region and the latter region as
the Case 3 region. The Case 2 (Case 3) region is shown as the area shaded
dark gray (as the area without shading) in Table 1. Then, we can easily
con¯rm that the Case 3 region lies in the area where the values of Á and
® are larger than those in the Case 2. As discussed in Results 1, 2 and 3,
when the both values Á and ® are smaller (Case 2), the \uniform pricing
e®ect" is likely to dominate the \strengthened negotiation e®ect". Thus,
parallel importation leads to lower R&D investment. However, when the
values of both Á and ® are larger (Case 3), the \strengthened negotiation
e®ect" is likely to dominate the \uniform pricing e®ect". Thus, parallel
importation leads to higher R&D investment.
Before concluding this section, we con¯rm the impact of parallel importa-
tion upon the net total pro¯t of the domestic ¯rm by explicitly considering
the di®erences in the level as well as the cost of R&D investment between
the R and the NR regimes.
Proposition 2.
Suppose the di®erences in the level as well as the cost of the R&D
investment between the R and the NR regimes are explicitly taken
into account.
1. In the Case 1 and Case 2 regions, the net total pro¯t of the domestic
¯rm under the NR regime ¦^NR(sNR) is larger than or equal to in
that under the R regime ¦^R(sR).
2. In the Case 3 region, the net total pro¯t of the domestic ¯rm under
the R regime ¦^R(sR) is larger than or equal to that under the NR
regime ¦^NR(sNR).
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6 Welfare Analysis
This section examines how parallel importation in°uences the consumer
surplus of the home and the foreign countries. Parallel importation in-
°uences the consumer surplus in the following two di®erent ways. First,
it in°uences the consumer surplus through its impact upon the pricing
regime. We denote this as the \pricing regime e®ect". Second, it in°u-
ences the consumer surplus through its impact upon the level of R&D
investment. We denote it as the \R&D investment e®ect". For the clarity
of the analysis, we ¯rst ignore the \R&D investment e®ect". By using the
results in Equations (7), (8),(20) and (21), we obtain the following Lemma.
Lemma 2.
Suppose there is no change in R&D investment under either the R
regime and NR regime
1. Then, when Á <
p
2¡1 (in the Case 1 region), the consumer surplus
of the home country is the same under either the NR-regime or the
R-regime, while the consumer surplus of the foreign country under
the R regime is lower than or equal to that under the NR regime.
2. Then, when Á ¸ p2 ¡ 1 (in the Case 2 and Case 3 regions), the
consumer surplus of the home country with the R regime is higher
than or equal to that with the NR regime, whereas the consumer
surplus of the foreign country with the R regime is lower than or
equal to that with the NR regime.
Then, by explicitly considering both the \pricing regime e®ect" and the
\R&D investment e®ect", we obtain the following proposition.
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Proposition 3.
Suppose the di®erences in the R&D investment between the R regime
and the NR regime are explicitly taken into account.
1. Then, in the Case 1 region, the consumer surplus of the home (for-
eign) country under the R regime is lower than or equal to that under
the NR regime.
2. Then, in the Case 2 region, the consumer surplus of the foreign coun-
try with the R regime is lower than or equal to that with the NR
regime, while it is ambiguous whether the consumer surplus of the
home country with the R regime is higher or lower than with the NR
regime.
3. Then, in the Case 3 region, the consumer surplus of the home country
with the R regime is higher than or equal to that with the NR regime,
while it is ambiguous whether the consumer surplus of the foreign
country in the R regime is higher or lower than under the NR regime.
Proposition 3-1 indicates that parallel importation deteriorates the con-
sumer surplus of the home and the foreign country in the Case 1 region, if
we consider the \R&D investment e®ect" explicitly. The Case 1 region is
de¯ned as the parameter region of (Á, ®), which satis¯es Á <
p
2 ¡ 1. In
the Case 1 region, as discussed in Lemma 2-1, the \pricing regime e®ect"
has no in°uence upon the consumer surplus of the home country. However,
as shown in Table 1, parallel importation lowers R&D investment because
of the \loss of foreign market e®ect". This lowers R&D investment and
induces reduced quality of the product. Thus, parallel importation dete-
riorates the consumer surplus of the home country through its negative
impacts upon R&D investment. In addition, as discussed in Lemma 2-
1, parallel importation induces the ¯rm to not sell in the foreign market.
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Thus, it makes the consumer surplus of the foreign country become zero.
Proposition 3-2 indicates that parallel importation deteriorates the con-
sumer surplus of the foreign country in the Case 2 region, whereas its
impact upon the consumer surplus of the home country is ambiguous, if
we consider the \R&D investment e®ect" explicitly. The Case 2 region is
de¯ned as the parameter region of (Á, ®) where parallel importation lowers
the R&D investment when Á ¸ p2¡ 1, since the \uniform pricing e®ect"
dominates the \strengthened negotiation e®ect". Lower R&D investment
means lower quality of the product. Moreover, Lemma 2-2 shows that the
\pricing regime e®ect" deteriorates the consumer surplus of the foreign
country. Thus, parallel importation unambiguously deteriorates the con-
sumer surplus of the foreign country. The lower R&D investment induced
by parallel importation also has a negative impact upon the consumer
surplus of the home country. However, as shown in Lemma 2-2, the \pric-
ing regime e®ect" provides positive impacts upon the consumer surplus
of the home country. Thus, it is ambiguous whether parallel importation
improves or deteriorates the consumer surplus of the home country.
Proposition 3-3 indicates that parallel importation improves the con-
sumer surplus of the home country in the Case 3 region, whereas its impact
upon the consumer surplus of the foreign country is ambiguous, if we con-
sider the \R&D investment e®ect" explicitly. The Case 3 region is de¯ned
as the parameter region of (Á, ®) where parallel importation leads to higher
R&D investment when Á ¸ p2 ¡ 1, since the \strengthened negotiation
e®ect" dominates the \uniform pricing e®ect". The higher R&D invest-
ment means higher product quality. Moreover, Lemma 2-2 shows that the
\pricing regime e®ect" improves the consumer surplus of the home country.
Therefore, parallel imports unambiguously improve the consumer surplus
of the home country. The higher R&D investment induced by the parallel
import also has a positive impact upon the consumer surplus of the foreign
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country. However, as shown in Lemma 2-2, the \pricing regime e®ect"
has a negative impact upon the consumer surplus of the foreign country.
Thus, it is ambiguous whether parallel imports improve or deteriorate the
consumer surplus of the foreign country.
By explicitly considering the \R&D investment e®ect", we can observe
the following two interesting results. Propositions 2-1 and 2-2 suggest that
parallel importation may deteriorate not only the consumer surplus of the
foreign country, but also the consumer surplus of the home country in
the Case 1 and Case 2 regions because of its negative impact upon the
R&D investment. Thus, in the Case 1 and Case 2 regions, as the neg-
ative impact of the parallel import upon the R&D investment increases,
parallel importation is more likely to deteriorate the consumer surplus of
the home country. This possibility of home consumer surplus deterioration
due to parallel importation is not examined rigorously in previous litera-
ture. Moreover, by explicitly considering the existence of the \price control
based price di®erentials", we can observe the Case 3 region where parallel
importation leads to higher R&D investment. In the Case 3 region, as
shown in Proposition 2-3, parallel importation may improve not only the
consumer surplus of the home country, but also the consumer surplus of
the foreign country because of its positive impact upon R&D investment.
Thus, in the Case 3 region, as the positive impact of parallel importa-
tion upon R&D investment increases, parallel importation is more likely
to improve the consumer surplus of the foreign country. This possibility of
foreign consumer surplus improvement due to the parallel import is also
not examined rigorously in previous literature.
These considerations suggest that parallel importation is likely to dete-
riorate (improve) the consumer surplus of the home country in the Case 2
region if its negative impact upon R&D investment increases (decreases).
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In addition, parallel importation is likely to improve (deteriorate) the con-
sumer surplus of the foreign country in the Case 3 region, if its positive
impact upon the R&D investment increases (decreases).
To con¯rm the result discussed above, we again give a numerical ex-
ample. Here, to save journal space, we only concentrate on the cunsumer
surplus of the foreign country. Table 2 shows the di®erence in the consumer
surplus of the foreign country CSFR ¡ CSFNR. Again, the Case 1 region is
shown as the light gray shaded area, the Case 2 region is shown as the dark
gray shaded area, and the Case 3 region is expressed as the area without
shading. A lower value of ¯ means a lower slope of the marginal cost
function of the R&D investment. Simple calculation shows that a lower
value of ¯ induces larger di®erences in investments (jsR ¡ sNRj) between
the two regimes. Therefore, the positive impact of parallel imports upon
the R&D investment becomes larger in the Case 3 region. Table 2 shows
the case in which ¯ is small (¯ = 1:1) and thus the \R&D investment
e®ect" is large. In this case, the \ R&D investment e®ect" can dominate
the \pricing regime e®ect". Thus, we can ¯nd some regions where parallel
importation improves the consumer surplus of the foreign country in the
Case 3 region. Thus, when ¯ is small (¯ = 1:1) and the \R&D investment
e®ect" is large, we can observe the somewhat counterintuitive impact of
parallel trade.
7 Concluding Remarks
This paper showed that parallel importation might enhance pharmaceu-
tical innovation when the bargaining power of the foreign government is
strong and the price elasticity of demand in the foreign market is small.
We also showed that this increase in R&D induced by parallel importa-
tion might even increase the consumer surplus of the foreign country. This
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possibility of foreign consumer surplus improvement due to parallel impor-
tation has not been considered rigorously in previous literature.
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